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Abstract
In this paper we consider a moral hazard problem between a creditworthy ￿rm
which needs funding and a bank. We ￿rst study under which conditions the ￿rm
does not obtain the loan. We then determine whether and how the intervention of
an external ￿nancial institution can facilitate the access to credit. In particular, we
focus on the European Investment Bank Group (EIBG), which provides (i) speci￿c
credit lines to help banks that ￿nance small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
and (ii) guarantees for portfolios of SMEs￿loans. We show that only during crises
the EIBG intervention allows to totally overcome the credit crunch.
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11 Introduction
The recent crisis of the global ￿nancial system has been generated by a multiplicity of
factors, among which the failure of national and international regulation systems. The
proliferation of creative ￿nancial innovations catered to investors￿demand for higher
return, but many of these instruments turned out to be riskier than they initially ap-
peared. Financial regulation was ine⁄ective and limited in scope. The system collapsed,
banks became reluctant to grant loans and many creditworthy investors were denied the
access to credit due to a sudden tightening of the conditions required to obtain a loan.
The crisis rapidly spread from the ￿nancial markets to the real economy, thus exacer-
bating the e⁄ects of the global economic slowdown. Since then many economists and
policy-makers agreed on the necessity to revamp the scope of ￿nancial regulation and
improve the provision of liquidity. During the most recent G7, G8 and G20 meetings,
participants called for urgent reforms and proposed to enhance liquidity and funding
through traditional and newly created instruments.
Starting from these considerations, the aim of our paper is to pinpoint which role
supranational ￿nancial institutions can play in their attempt to solve, or at least miti-
gate, information problems between lenders and creditworthy borrowers. This becomes
of fundamental importance especially in periods of crisis, where trust between economic
agents has to be re-established. In particular, we will target credit crunch problems
faced by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs henceforth).
Notwithstanding the relevance of the topic, relative scanty attention has been paid
to the speci￿c analysis of external ￿nancial institutions that reduce information asym-
metries in credit markets. Our contribution lies at the crossroads between two streams
of research, one dealing with government intervention in credit markets and the other
with the bene￿cial role of generic mediators. The issue of government support in credit
provision with ￿nancial informational frictions has been studied by DeMeza and Webb
(1987), Innes (1991) and Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000), inter alii. Williamson (1994)
and Wang and Williamson (1998) consider public intervention which eliminates infor-
mation asymmetries caused by costly state veri￿cation. On the other hand, the positive
e⁄ect of external mediators has been initially examined by Myerson (1986) and Forges
(1986) in communication games. Fedele and Mantovani (2008) show that delegation
of hidden tasks to a third agent can mitigate the informational asymmetry between
a start-up entrepreneur and a bank, thus improving the e¢ ciency of the contracting
game. Mitusch and Strausz (1999) demonstrate that the presence of consulting com-
panies reduces informational frictions within a ￿rm.
In the ￿rst part of this paper we provide a careful analysis of a credit market
equilibria before and after the intervention of an external ￿nancial institution which
supports the lending activity of the bank towards the ￿rm. In the second part we
evaluate the speci￿c instruments used by the ￿nancial institution and suggest how to
improve the e⁄ectiveness of such an intervention.
2To represent the informational problem, we adopt a simple moral hazard model ￿ la
De Meza and Webb (1987) in which a wealthless ￿rm applies for a bank loan to invest
in two alternative risky projects: the good (or creditworthy) project has a positive
expected value but is more costly to be implemented, in terms of the ￿rm￿ s e⁄ort; the
bad project requires a less intense e⁄ort but its expected value is obviously lower than
the good one, and in most cases also negative. The bank cannot verify the ￿rm￿ s choice
of the project: this generates the information asymmetry in the form of a moral hazard
(Holmstrom, 1979).
As anticipated above, we take into account two alternative scenarios: before (with-
out) or after (with) the intervention of the external ￿nancial institution. The initial
aim of our analysis is to unveil the mechanisms through which a ￿nancial institution
can alleviate the credit crunch.
We start by considering the case in which the lending process is not supported by
the ￿nancial institution. The ￿rm applies for the funds and it is induced to implement
the good project in exchange for a su¢ ciently high informational rent. We ￿nd that
there exists a wide interval region, where the rent is high relatively to the project￿ s
value in case of success, in which the loan is not granted and a credit crunch occurs.
In the second scenario, the bank resorts to an external ￿nancial institution which
favours the lending process essentially by an appropriate combination of two instru-
ments: (i) co-funding of the investment project and (ii) provision of guarantees the
bank gets if the project fails.1 We show that the intervention of the external agent
drastically reduces the occurrence of the credit crunch.
In the ￿nal part of our paper we evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of the tools adopted by
the ￿nancial institution. Under the theoretical conditions of our model, we demonstrate
that by increasing the percentage of co-funding and the amount of guarantee, the credit
crunch area can be further reduced. Yet, only if the spread between the cost of rais-
ing capital for the bank as compared to that of the ￿nancial institution is su¢ ciently
high, the area can be completely eliminated. This is what exactly happened since the
intensi￿cation of the ￿nancial crisis in September 2009: the interest rate spreads on
government bonds of many EU countries with di⁄erent credit ratings have dramatically
risen (Sgherri and Zoli, 2009), due to a higher risk aversion in international ￿nancial
markets (Schuknecht, von Hagen and Wolswijk, 2009). This fact implies that especially
during crises the intervention of the external ￿nancial institution turns out to be pow-
erful, in that it allows to totally overcome the credit crunch. In the speci￿c example of
our model, the intervention allows the bank to always ￿nance a creditworthy project.
More generally speaking, it helps the recovery of the economy by stimulating the credit
market.
As it has been mentioned before, we are particularly interested in interventions
1In a somewhat related paper, Arping, Loranth and Morrison (2010) consider the support by the
state in form of credit guarantees and loan subsidies to entrepreneurs which are capital constrained
and subject to moral hazard.
3targeted to SMEs. In the US, the Small Business Administration (SBA) actively en-
gages in provision of direct loans and bank loan guarantees. The situation is more
ambiguous in Europe, and this is why we base our analysis in such a context. The
European Monetary Union lacks both a centralized ￿scal mechanism to absorb asym-
metric shocks and a common institution capable to ease possible shortage of liquidity
in the European markets. These structural de￿cits have been blindingly obvious in the
aftermath of the ￿nancial crisis. In an open letter addressed to the European leaders,
several economists asserted that European-level actions must supplement and coordi-
nate the national e⁄orts on recapitalization of the banking sector.2 They argued that
such disposals, necessary to solve the present situation and to prevent the occurrence of
a future ￿nancial crisis, should be carried out by an institution which acts as a Lender
of Last Resort.3 In Europe the natural Lender of Last Resort should be the ECB, but
the Protocol of ESCB/ECB, art. 25, chapter V, allows it only to o⁄er non-binding
advice regarding the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of
the ￿nancial system. The recent creation of the European Systemic Risk Council and
of the European System of Financial Supervisors bank is intended to improve bank
regulation and supervision across borders, but we are looking at proper supranational
credit institutions which actively help ￿rms to get access to credit. This is why we turn
our attention to the European Investment Bank Group, which is particularly quali￿ed
to play the role of the external ￿nancial institution that we have in mind. In the next
section we will justify our choice.
The potential impact of the European Investment Bank Group deserves additional
attention if one considers that the recent ￿nancial turmoil has raised the cost of raising
capital, one of the crucial factors of our paper. This contributed to deteriorate the
attractiveness of risky investments, such as those proposed by SMEs. The EIBG,
which is highly rated, introduced ￿anti-crisis measures￿and became a stable anchor
for banks wishing to ￿nance ￿rms navigating in stormy waters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the functions of the European Investment Bank Group. The formal model is laid out
in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 consider the two scenarios described above, respectively
before and after the intervention of the ￿nancial institution. In Section 6 we characterize
the importance of such an intervention and suggest how to eliminate the credit crunch.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2￿ Open Letter to European leaders on Europe￿ s banking crisis: A call to action￿ , by A. Alesina, R.
Baldwin, T. Boeri, F. Giavazzi, D. Gros, S. Micossi, G. Tabellini, C. Wyplosz and K. F. Zimmermann,
appeared on 1 October 2008 on VoxEU.org, a CEPR policy portal.
3The theory of the Lender of Last Resort, elaborated by Bagehot (1873), asserts that an institution,
usually a country￿ s central bank, has to o⁄er loans to banks or other eligible institutions that are
experiencing ￿nancial di¢ culty or are considered highly risky or near collapse, and whose failure would
dramatically a⁄ect the economy. During a credit crunch, the Lender of Last Resort￿ s functions are
both to protect private investors who have deposited funds, and to prevent panic withdrawing from
solvent banks who have temporary limited liquidity.
42 The European Investment Bank Group
The European Investment Bank Group (EIBG henceforth) was established in 2000 to
bring the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF)
under the same umbrella. The EIB was founded under the Treaty of Rome as the
EU￿ s long-term lending institution. As de￿ned by the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, pursuant to Article 309, the task of the EIB is ￿to contribute, by
having recourse to the capital market and utilizing its own resources, to the balanced
and steady development of the internal market in the interest of the Union￿ .4 The EIF,
instead, was created in 1994 to support the development of SMEs. Its main operations
regard venture capital and guaranteeing loans. Complementing EIB￿ s product o⁄ering,
the EIF promotes "the implementation of European Community policies, notably in
the ￿eld of entrepreneurship, technology, innovation and regional development".5 The
relationship between the EIB and the EIF aims at encouraging a productive sharing of
expertise in support of SMEs.
The EIBG as a whole is engaged into two main activities: the disbursement or
partial-disbursement (co-funding henceforth) of loans, and the provision of guarantees.
Let us look at their speci￿c functioning, as this will represent the theoretical ground
to model the intervention of the ￿nancial institution.
The ￿rst activity is particularly related to the general commitment of the EIB to-
wards the integration, development and economic and social cohesion of the EU Member
States, ￿on a non-pro￿t maximizing basis￿ .6 This special feature allows the EIB to lend
almost at the cost of borrowing. Since it does not distribute dividends to its sharehold-
ers, any euro earned is retained in order to cover the EIB￿ s expenses, and to refund
its operations and programs. The EIB￿ s capital is subscribed by EU member States;
the EIB raises resources through bond-issues and other debt instruments (EIB Statute,
2009). The EIB￿ s "￿rm shareholder support, [...] strong capital base, exceptional as-
set quality, conservative risk management and [...] sound funding strategy" constitute
the reasons for its constant triple-A credit rating, assigned by Moody￿ s, Standard and
Poor￿ s, and Fitch.7
The EIB provides di⁄erent kinds of loan. The individual loans are addressed to
projects with a total investment cost higher than 25 million euros. They are available
for promoters in both public and private sectors, including banks, and ￿nanced directly
by the EIB. They are not the subject of our paper. We focus instead on intermediated
loans, which are credit lines granted to intermediary banks (or other ￿nancial insti-
tutions) to facilitate the ￿nancing of projects proposed by SMEs.8 The ￿rm has to
4O¢ cial Journal of the European Union, C 115 of 9.5.2008: ￿Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union￿ .
5EIF website: "About Us".
6EIB website: "About the EIB".
7EIB website: "About the EIB".
8More precisely, these credit lines are directed to SMEs with total maximum cost lower than 25
5apply directly to the intermediary institutions to which the credit lines are o⁄ered. Re-
quirements for application may vary according to the respective intermediary, as "the
conditions of ￿nancing (interest rate, grace period, loan period etc.) are determined
by the respective EIB partner bank".9 Nonetheless, one of the mission of the EIB is to
stimulate competition among the intermediaries so as to pass on to SMEs the generous
credit conditions o⁄ered by the EIB. The shortage of liquidity caused by the recent
crisis augmented the quest for partnership by commercial banks, thus increasing the
bargaining power of the EIB and actually giving vigor to competition in the banking
sector. This will be a crucial assumption of our theoretical model.
The second activity of providing guarantee instruments is carried out by the EIF.
Two main products are worth mentioning, the Credit Enhancement-Securitisation
and the Guarantees/Counter-Guarantees for portfolios of micro-credits, SME loans
or leases. The former, that will be explicitly considered in our model, concerns oper-
ations conducted by using guarantees provided by the EIF, which is directly involved
in the SMEs￿loans securitization transaction. The latter relates to di⁄erent European
framework programmes, such as the "Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Pro-
gramme" (CIP 2007-2013), managed by the EIF on behalf of the European Commission
who set them up to support SMEs￿activities and development.10
Regarding the securitization transaction, the guarantee support is of fundamental
importance. Under the Basel II capital requirements, the banks￿ability to raise funds
is conditional to the soundness of their credit exposures. In such a scenario, banks can
transfer part of the risk of their portfolios through securitization transactions, in order
to increase their lending capacity. In other words, securitization works like an insurance
for loans, as the credit exposure attached to every loan is transferred from a bank to
an investor, by issuing notes (called ￿asset backed-securities￿ ) on the capital market.
The bank has to pay the investor a fee for the protection, and in case of default the
investor pays the loss. The credit rating of the securitized loans is connected with the
one assigned to the ￿nancial institution covering that speci￿c part of the risk. In case of
support by the EIF, even in presence of SMEs moral hazard, the rating of the covered
loans is enhanced, due to the zero risk-weighting assigned to assets guaranteed by the
EIF.11 The bene￿cial role of the EIBG in the securitization transactions is supported
by di⁄erent studies (e.g. Robinson 2009, Janda 2008, ￿IR-Managementdienste GmbH
2007, European Commission 2006 and AMTE Final Report 2006).
However, and this will be very important for the policy implications of our paper,
the EIBG set limits to the provision of loans and guarantee support. As for the co-
funding, the intervention covers up to 50% of the initial investment needs. It has been
argued that the imposition of a ceiling aims at avoiding opportunistic behaviors by the
million euros (small-sized enterprises) or up to 50 million euros (medium-sized enterprises).
9EIB website: "Intermediated Loans".
10EIF website, ￿ Guarantees & Securitisation￿ .
11EIF website, ￿ Credit Enhancement￿ .
6partner banks.12
In order to preserve the achievement of the EIBG￿ s objectives, in particular the
support to SMEs, the EIB Corporate Operational Plan (2009) specify conditions and
constraints in relation with its activities. With regard to the selection of the part-
ner bank, the EIB￿ s evaluation concerns an overall assessment of its credit worthiness
in conjunction with its historical experience in the SMEs sector. In the contractual
arrangement between the EIB and the partner bank, the amount of funding granted
by the EU institution is calculated on the basis of the intermediate bank￿ s capability
to originate loans without the EIB￿ s credit facilities. The EIB controls the reliability of
the budgeted amount set by the partner bank and it disburse the credit lines accord-
ingly. Moreover, the EIBG intervention creates a positive surplus through the ￿ leverage
e⁄ect￿ . Every partner bank is obliged to pass on to the ￿nal bene￿ciary the ￿nancial
bene￿t generated by the EIB￿ s involvement: "for each euro provided by the EIB the
partner bank undertakes to lend at least two to SMEs, so creating a leverage e⁄ect".13
The EIB estimated the leverage factor between its ￿nancing and the total value of the
investment as a range between 2 and 10 times.14 This is consistent with Robinson
(2009), who found that during the period 2004-2006 the leveraging factor generated by
the EIB￿ s lending activity in the EU ranged between 4.8 and 23.9.
3 The basic model
A wealthless ￿rm needs funding to implement a business based on two alternative risky
projects. Project i, i = H;L, yields a per-unit-of-investment return a with probabil-
ity p(ei) 2 (0;1) and 0 otherwise; ei is a nontransferable e⁄ort, whose per-unit-of-
investment disutility has a monetary equivalent equal to c(ei). We assume a linear
speci￿cation for both the e⁄ort disutility and the success probability: c(ei) = ci and
p(ei) = pi. Moreover, we let cH = c > 0 = cL and pH > pL: project H entails a bigger
e⁄ort cost than project L but succeeds with higher probability.
The ￿nancial contracting game begins when the ￿rm applies for a bank loan, whose
amount is normalized to one. The timing of the game is as follows. At t = 0, ￿rst the
bank designs a loan proposal, then the ￿rm decides whether to accept it or not. If the
loan is granted, in the time span between t = 0 and t = 1, the ￿rm chooses between
projects H and L, i.e. it decides whether to exert an extra e⁄ort cost ￿c ￿ cH￿cL = c,
thereby increasing the success probability by ￿p ￿ pH ￿pL, or to shirk. This choice is
assumed to be hidden, thus giving rise to a moral hazard problem between the lender
and the borrower. At t = 1 returns accrue and the ￿rm repays the bank. If the ￿rm does
not apply for the loan, or the loan is not granted, the project cannot be implemented:
the ￿rm￿ s outside option is zero.
12Interview information, EIF o¢ cial, December 2009.
13EIB website: "EIB Loans for SMEs".
14EIB website: "EIB Directors approve anti-crisis measures for 2009-2010".
7An additional possibility for the bank is to monitor the behavior of the ￿rm by
paying a ￿xed cost equal to m.15 Monitoring is assumed to make the agent￿ s behavior
perfectly observable. The choice of the bad project is detected with probability one, in
which case a non-monetary punishment can be imposed to the ￿rm: the moral hazard
issue disappears as the ￿rm has no incentive to shirk if the punishment is su¢ ciently
high.
In the light of what has been described in the Introduction, we study the e⁄ect
of an external ￿nancial institution on credit availability by considering two alternative
scenarios. In the ￿rst one, describing the ￿ without the EIBG￿case, the ￿rm resorts to a
local bank (LB, henceforth) to obtain the unit of capital necessary to start the project.
In the second one, the ￿ with the EIBG￿case, the loan application is directed to an
intermediary bank (IB, henceforth) supported by an external ￿nancial institution (FI,
henceforth); the IB is required to concede just a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of the unit of capital
since it receives from the FI a monetary amount (1 ￿ ￿) to be used for ￿nancing the
￿rm. Moreover, the FI provides an additional guarantee W to insure the bank against
the project￿ s failure.
The players of our game are supposed to be risk-neutral. Furthermore, banks are
assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive environment. We opt for this hypothesis
because in our speci￿c case study, following the discussion in Section 2, one of the
objectives of the EIBG is to stimulate competition in the banking sector, as partner
banks should be induced to pass on to the ￿nal bene￿ciary the favorable credit con-
ditions that they enjoy.16 One may object that the LB bank is not subject to such a
pressure. Yet, the hypothesis of the same degree of competition for both representative
banks allows to isolate the e⁄ect of the FI on credit availability without changing the
market conditions in which the banks operate. Moreover, we will show that by relaxing
the assumption of a perfectly competitive credit market for the LB does not modify
our main results, hence we can assume .
We can now describe the di⁄erent features characterizing the two scenarios.
(i) When resorting to the LB, the ￿rm is o⁄ered a standard debt contract frg, where
r 2 [1;a] is the gross interest rate due by the ￿rm only in case of success. The ￿rm￿ s
expected share is
ui ￿ pi (a ￿ r) ￿ ci, (1)
where ci is the ￿rm￿ s nontransferable e⁄ort cost. The bank￿ s expected surplus is:
vi ￿ pir ￿ ￿; (2)
15One can think of the time spent by the banks to directly monitor the behavior of the ￿rm, parameter
m thereby representing the opportunity cost of not devoting that time to other productive activities.
Hauswald and Marquez (2006) assert that the aquisition of information via monitoring implies costly
screening and other losses in terms of time, e⁄ort and resources employed by the bank.
16In general, the process of deregulation that took place in the last decades removed many restrictions
on competition in the banking sector: an excellent survey is provided by Carletti (2008).
8where ￿ represents the bank￿ s unitary cost of raising money, for example by issuing
bonds or collecting deposits. Summing up (1) and (2) gives the expected welfare when
project i is implemented:
si ￿ pia ￿ ci ￿ ￿: (3)
(ii) When the ￿rm applies to the intermediary, the debt contract is fRg, where
R 2 [1;a] is the gross interest rate,
Ui ￿ pi (a ￿ R) ￿ ci (4)
is the ￿rm￿ s expected share,
Vi ￿ piR + (1 ￿ pi)W ￿ ￿ (W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)pi￿ ￿ ￿￿ (W) (5)
is the IB￿ s expected share and
Zi ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)pi￿ ￿ (1 ￿ pi)W + ￿ (W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (6)
is the FI￿ s share. Expressions (5) and (6) show the way we model guarantee provision
and co-funding by the FI. On the one hand, the IB pays a monetary amount ￿ (W) > 0,
with ￿0 > 0, in exchange for the guarantee W which receives by the FI if the ￿rm￿ s
project fails (with probability 1 ￿ pi). On the other hand, (1 ￿ ￿) is the amount lent
by the FI to the IB to ￿nance the ￿rm￿ s project; ￿ is the unitary gross remuneration
the IB owes to the FI only when the project succeeds (with probability pi) in return for
capital borrowed. Finally, parameter ￿ represents the FI￿ s unitary cost of raising money,
while ￿ (W) is the IB￿ s unitary cost of raising money, which depends on the amount of
guarantee. The functional form of ￿ (W) will be speci￿ed in the next subsection.
Summing up (4), (5) and (6), one gets the expected welfare Si when project i is
implemented in presence of the FI:
Si ￿ pia ￿ ci ￿ ￿￿(W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿: (7)
Before proceeding, we need to characterize the parameter region in which the ￿nan-
cial contracting game is being played.
3.1 Initial conditions: the region of interest
The initial conditions of the game represent the starting point of our analysis. They
are derived from the study of the activity of the EIBG.
Based on the constant triple-A credit rating enjoyed by the EIB compared to a
worse rating for a local bank, we ￿rst assume that the cost of raising money is lower
for the FI than for the LB:
￿ < ￿: (8)
Second, we specify the functional form for ￿ (W), the IB￿ s unitary cost of raising
money. Recall that the guarantee W insures the IB against the credit risk when ￿nanc-
ing the ￿rm￿ s project. We assume that the risk-neutral IB￿ s utility is indirectly a⁄ected
9by the degree of insurance: the higher W, the lower the risk perceived by risk-averse
bondholders and/or depositors on IB￿ s assets. They will, in turn, require lower returns,
thus reducing the cost ￿ (W). The upper bound on ￿ (W) is for W = 0 and equals ￿,
the same cost sustained by the LB, which receives no guarantees. By contrast the IB,
when fully or over insured (W ￿ R), incurs the same cost ￿ borne by the highly credit





￿ if W = 0
￿ < f (W) < ￿ if 0 < W < R
￿ if W ￿ R
(9)
where f0 (W) < 0.
Given condition (8) and the functional form for ￿ (W), it follows that the FI gener-
ates a higher expected welfare by reducing the cost of ￿nancing:
￿S ￿ Si ￿ si = ￿ ￿ ￿￿(W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ > 0. (10)
As for the welfare generated by the investment project:











(i) sH > 0 > sL and (ii) SH > maxfSL;0g: (11)
The expected total surplus is always positive when the ￿rm behaves. On the con-
trary, the project is due to fail when the ￿rm does not behave and the LB provides
the loan, while we allow for the possibility that SL ? 0, i.e. when the loan is granted
by the IB the project may have positive NPV even if the ￿rm shirks because of the
reduced cost of ￿nancing. This has to do with the general mission of the EIBG, whose
top operational priority is to support the investments of SMEs, though this requires a
very generous commitment in sectors where the risk of failing is high. As the ￿nancial
crisis penalized in particular the access to credit of SMEs, we do not want to neglect
the role that the FI can play in generating a positive surplus even in presence of the
low e⁄ort from those players so seriously hit by the liquidity constraints in the ￿nancial
markets.
Finally, regarding the monitoring cost:
Assumption 2 m > SH, i.e. the cost of monitoring is higher than the maximum
expected welfare.
Di⁄erent sources of theoretical literature agree on the inability of lenders to monitor
project outcomes at su¢ ciently low cost (see Townsend 1979, Williamson 1986, Border
and Sobel 1987, and, more recently, Krasa and Villamil 2000, Lacker 2001 and Hvide
and Leite 2007).
17The condition sH > 0 is solved by a > a, where a increases with c because the higher c, the lower,
ceteris paribus, sH ￿ pHa ￿ c ￿ ￿. A higher a is therefore needed to satisfy the condition.
104 The local bank: when the credit market is left alone
In this section we consider the scenario in which the external FI does not intervene and
only local banks are available on the market. Since the representative LB is competitive,
it sets the gross rate r in order to maximize the ￿rm￿ s share ui ￿ pi (a ￿ r)￿ci, otherwise
the ￿rm applies to a rival bank. The maximization is subject to the LB￿ s participation
constraint vi ￿ pir ￿ ￿ > 0 and the ￿rm￿ s incentive compatibility constraint ui > u￿i,
with i = H;L (and ￿i = L;H). This ensures that choosing project i instead of project
￿i gives a higher share to the ￿rm.
Since ui is decreasing in r, the LB sets the gross rate at the lowest value with the
e⁄ect that the IB￿ s participation constraint becomes binding:




There are two levels of r such that the LB breaks even, depending on the ￿rm￿ s project
choice: rL ￿
￿
pL and rH ￿
￿
pH, with rL > rH. If the ￿rm decides to shirk the project
succeeds with lower probability, hence the LB is forced to charge a higher rate, otherwise
it would incur a loss.
The ￿rm￿ s incentive compatibility constraint is:




The ￿rm behaves only if R 6 ^ r. In fact, e⁄ort disutility￿ s negative e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s
expected share is outdone by the positive e⁄ect of the increased success probability
only for relatively low values of the gross interest rate.
In line of principles, the following three cases have to be accounted for: rH < rL ￿ ^ r,
rH ￿ ^ r < rL and ^ r < rH < rL. The ￿rst two lead to the same result, hence they are
treated together through inequality







In this case the ￿rm chooses project H according to the above reasoning. It follows
that the break-even level is rH, which can be plugged into uH to give:
uH (rH) ￿ sH = pHa ￿ c ￿ ￿: (15)
The ￿rm accepts the LB￿ s proposal rH because it ends up with the entire surplus sH,
whose value is supposed to be positive under Assumption 1.
On the contrary, if rH > ^ r, i.e. a < aN, then the ￿rm chooses project L and the
LB￿ s breaks even in rL =
￿
pL > rH. Substituting rL into uL yields sL: in this case the
LB￿ s proposal is not accepted by the ￿rm that would otherwise end up with sL < 0
under Assumption 1. The possibility for the LB to monitor the ￿rm at cost m > 0 is
ruled out by Assumption 2.
We can summarize the result of our analysis as:
11Lemma 1 When the ￿rm applies to the local bank, (i) the loan is granted if a ￿ aN,
in which case the expected welfare is sH; (ii) the loan is not granted if a < aN
and the resulting expected welfare is nil:
Proof Directly follows from Assumption 1 and 2 and by inspecting (14). ￿
The ￿rm￿ s equilibrium expected share (15) is a⁄ected positively by the expected
return a and negatively by both the cost of raising fund ￿ and the e⁄ort disutility c.
When a < aN the expected gain is low relatively to the costs. This is more likely to
occur in a period of crisis, in which case the ￿rm does not accept the LB￿ s loan proposal
as it is not properly motivated to implement the good project.
Figure 1 illustrates the results of Lemma 1 in the parametric space (c;a). Notice
that aN divides the interval region of interest a 2 (a;a) in two parts, as its vertical
intercept (when c = 0) coincides with that of a but its slope is steeper. The area
a 2 (a;aN] represents the credit crunch.

























































In the Appendix we study the case of a monopolistic local bank. We ￿nd that the
result of Lemma 1 still holds, the only di⁄erence being a redistribution of the total
surplus between the bank and the ￿rm. This con￿rms that the hypothesis of a local
competitive banking sector does not a⁄ect our ￿ndings.
125 The intermediary bank supported by the external ￿-
nancial institution
In this section we consider the situation where the ￿rm resorts to the IB supported by
the external FI which provides co-funding and additional guarantees. It is ￿rst worth
recalling that we tailor the intervention of the FI on the basis of our analysis of the
EIBG, whose lending activity is ruled by the EIB on a non-pro￿t maximizing basis. We
assume therefore that the FI has a nonpro￿t status, which implies in our model that its
unitary remuneration ￿ is determined through the break-even condition Zi = 0. From
(6):




(1 ￿ pi)W ￿ ￿ (W)
pi (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿i: (16)
There are two break-even levels of ￿, depending on the ￿rm￿ s project choice, with
￿L > ￿H. Plugging the above value into the IB￿ s share (5), one gets:
Vij￿=￿i ￿ piR ￿ ￿￿ (W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿: (17)
We ￿rst study the ￿rm￿ s project choice, starting from the incentive compatibility
condition:
UH > UL , R 6 a ￿
c
￿p
￿ ^ r: (18)
Inequality (18) puts an upper bound on R: as explained in the previous section (see
inequality (13)) the ￿rm ￿nds it pro￿table to behave only if R 6 ^ r. The IB has thus
to solve two problems, depending on whether the ￿rm chooses project H or L:
max
R
UH ￿ pH (a ￿ R) ￿ c (19)




UL ￿ pL (a ￿ R) (20)
s.t. VL ￿ pLR ￿ ￿￿ (W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 0 and R > ^ r
Following the basic assumptions of our model, the banking sector is perfectly com-
petitive. The ￿rm has full bargaining power when it applies for the loan, hence the bank
sets R to maximize the ￿rm￿ s share, otherwise it loses the client. The IB￿ s participation
constraint is binding:
Vij￿=￿i = 0 if Ri =
￿￿ (W) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
pi
: (21)
Now we consider the two cases illustrated above. First, when
RH ￿ ^ r , a ￿ aB ￿






13the ￿rm chooses project H and the IB solves problem (19). Plugging RH into UH gives:
UH(RH) = SH = pHa ￿ c ￿ ￿￿(W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿: (23)
The ￿rm receives the entire ￿ good￿welfare SH, whose value is always positive under
Assumption 1.
On the contrary, when RH > ^ r, i.e. if a < aB, the ￿rm is induced to select project
L as the break-even condition for the bank requires RL > RH. The IB thus solves
problem (20). Substituting RL into UL yields:
UL(RL) = SL = pLa ￿ ￿￿(W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿: (24)
The ￿rm ends up with the entire ￿ bad￿ welfare SL, whose value has not been yet
examined. It is easy to check that:
SL ￿ 0 , a ￿ aL ￿
￿￿ (W) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
pL
: (25)
If condition (25) is satis￿ed, the ￿rm accepts the loan proposal by the bank and produces
surplus SL. Monitoring is not a viable option, as one can easily check taking into
account Assumption 2.
Before continuing, we have to locate the position of aB and aL in our region of
interest. First of all, from (10) (i) aB represents a rightward parallel shift as compared
to aN; (ii) aL represents a downward parallel shift as compared to a. See Figure 2.
Moreover,




(￿￿ (W) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿) (26)
and
aB ￿ a , c ￿ ^ c ￿
￿p
pL
(￿ ￿ ￿￿ (W) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿) (27)
where both ~ c and ^ c belong to the interval (0;c), as it can be easily ascertained. In
the next section we will come back to comparison between ~ c and ^ c and the precise
representation of aB and aL. For the moment it is su¢ cient to highlight that the above
values are compatible with the region of interest.
We can therefore sum up the main results of this section as follows:
Lemma 2 When the ￿rm applies to the intermediary bank supported by the ￿nancial
institution, (i) the loan is granted in a ￿ aL [a ￿ aB and the resulting expected
welfare is either SH for a ￿ aB or SL￿ 0 for aL ￿ a < aB; (ii) the loan is not
granted if a < aL \ a < aB and the expected welfare is nil.
Proof Directly follows from Assumption 1 and 2 and by inspecting (22), (25) and (26).
￿
14The results of Lemma 2 in the interval region of interest are depicted in Figure
2. Comparing this ￿gure to the one representing the local bank case (Figure 1), it is
evident that the area of credit crunch can be dramatically reduced by the intervention
of the external ￿nancial institution.















































































We can therefore claim that:
Proposition 1 The intervention of an external ￿nancial institution in support to the
lending activity of an intermediary bank mitigates the moral hazard problem
between the bank itself and a ￿rm which needs a loan to start a creditworthy
project.
Proof Directly follows from comparing Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 and by our previous
discussion on the respective position of aB and aL in the region of interest. ￿
The combination of co-funding and guarantees provided by a nonpro￿t external
agent as the FI represents therefore a powerful device to soften the credit crunch prob-
lem in periods of recession, where informational and monitoring costs are high, due
to limited trust between economic actors, relatively to projects￿returns. In the next
section we will investigate the mechanism underpinning the positive role of the external
￿nancial institution and suggest how to improve the e⁄ectiveness of its action.
15Turning to the welfare implications, consider the e⁄ort choice and loan arrangement
in our two scenarios and take into account Figure 2. First of all, the rightward shift
of aB implies an expansion of the area in which the ￿rm behaves and the loan is
granted. The expected surplus is now SH: (i) in a ￿ aN the ￿rm behaves under both
contractual environments, therefore the net welfare gain is ￿S ; (ii) in aB ￿ a < aN the
￿rm behaves only when the FI gives support, hence the net welfare gain is SH. Second,
the downward shift of aL gives rise to a new area of surplus SL, which is non-negative
for su¢ ciently high values of a. In particular, in aL ￿ a < aB the net welfare gain is
SL. Notwithstanding the low e⁄ort exerted by the ￿rm, the deriving negative e⁄ect on
the success probability is outweighed by the decrease in the cost of ￿nancing induced
by the FI.
6 On the elimination of the credit crunch
The initial aim of the analysis carried in the previous sections was to ￿nd a theoretical
road to model the role played by an external agent which intervenes to restore a credit
market seriously hit by the crisis. We described the problem faced by a ￿rm which
asks for a loan to two di⁄erent types of banks. In the ￿rst case the bank was left alone
and we found a relatively big area in which a credit crunch existed. In the second
case such an area shrank, thanks to the measures adopted by the FI in support of
intermediary bank￿ s lending activity. However, nothing has been said yet regarding the
extent of the credit crunch area remaining after the intervention of the FI. This is why
the mechanism through which the FI intervenes has to be further investigated.
Notice ￿rst that aB = aN and aL = a if ￿ = 1 and W = 0: in this case we would be
back to the LB case represented in Figure 1, in which neither co-funding nor guarantees
were available. Furthermore, it is easy to check that both aB and aL are decreasing
in W and increasing in ￿: the respective (and bene￿cial) rightward shift of aB and
downward shift of aL are proportional to the amount of guarantee and co-funding. The
two instruments are substitutes as they both reduce the cost of raising capital for the
IB, as it appears when taking into consideration (17) vis ￿ vis (2). Focus, for instance,
on the region where a ￿ aB, which requires that condition (22) holds, i.e. RH ￿ ^ r.
Given that RH is increasing in ￿ and decreasing in W, whilst ^ r is independent on ￿ and
W, RH ￿ ^ r is more likely to be satis￿ed when higher co-funding (￿ #) and/or higher
guarantees (W ") are provided by the FI. An analogous reasoning holds for a ￿ aL,
which solves SL ￿ 0. The economic intuition is as follows: on the one hand the FI￿ s
intervention reduces the gross interest rate Ri charged by the IB, thereby enlarging the
area in the parametric space (c;a) where the ￿rm chooses project H. On the other
hand it raises the value of welfare SL, thus increasing the area where the ￿rm accepts
the bank￿ s proposal.
It is worth verifying whether and how the FI￿ s intervention can completely eliminate
the credit crunch area: this occurs as long as ^ c ￿ ~ c in Figure 2. We can easily prove
16that:
Lemma 3 A necessary condition for the intervention of the ￿nancial institution to







Proof Take the case where the FI fully commits to help the intermediary institution,
i.e. to reduce the cost of raising funds up to its lowest level ￿: this is obtained
when ￿ = 0 and/or W = R. Consider the values ^ c and ~ c which appear respectively
in (26) and (27). After substituting ￿ = 0 and/or W = R into ^ c and ~ c, inequality
(28) solves ^ c ￿ ~ c. ￿
Lemma 3 highlights the importance of the costs of ￿nancing. When (28) is not
satis￿ed, a region of credit crunch still persists even in presence of the full support
by the FI (￿ = 0 and/or W = R). Only when the ratio between the cost or raising
capital with and without the intervention is su¢ ciently high, the credit crunch can be







￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
(29)
The function ￿￿ (W;￿) is depicted in Figure 3: it represents ￿ (W) as a function of ￿
and identi￿es the locus of points below (resp. above) which (~ c ￿ ^ c) is negative (resp.
positive). The feasible set for the FI￿ s support is ￿ (W) 2 [￿;￿] and ￿ 2 [0;1]. Notice
that ￿￿ (W;￿)j￿=0 = 1 and ￿￿ (W;￿)j￿=1 =
pH
pH+￿p￿: the latter value belongs to the
interval [￿;￿) given (28).
Figure 3 deserves an additional explanation. Ceteribus paribus, higher levels of co-
funding (1 ￿ ￿) are captured by a move to the left, while an increase in the guarantee W
is displayed by a move to the bottom, since ￿0 (W) < 0 for ￿ (W) 2 (￿;￿). For example,
point N represents a weak intervention in support of the IB and a credit crunch may
arise here, depending on the vales of c and a (see Figure 2), because (~ c ￿ ^ c) > 0. On
the contrary, a stronger support by the FI is shown in point M, which results from
the combined action of higher co-funding and guarantee: this is su¢ cient to eliminate
the credit crunch. Finally, notice that ￿￿ (W;￿) decreases with ￿, con￿rming that ￿
and W act as substitutes, in that smaller guarantees (￿￿ ") are needed to overcome the
credit crunch if the FI is providing a higher percentage of co-funding (￿ #).
The above discussion can be summarized in:
Proposition 2 When the ￿rm applies to the intermediary bank supported by the
￿nancial institution, the credit crunch problem can be completely eliminated
only if (i) (28) holds and (ii) the FI provides a su¢ ciently high combination of
co-funding and guarantees, the minimum level of which is indicated by (29).
17The result of Proposition 2 turns out to be interesting if the two relevant parametric
areas are interpreted as follows. In our model ￿ (resp. ￿) is the cost of raising fund
for the FI (resp. the LB) and the former is supposed to have the best credit rating,
while the latter a substantial worse one. As anticipated in the Introduction, the interest
rate spreads on government bonds of the EU countries have risen dramatically after
the intensi￿cation of the ￿nancial crisis. This con￿rms that during a crisis the spread
between ￿ and ￿ is likely to be su¢ ciently high to satisfy condition (28). The deriving
implication is worth remarking: an appropriate intervention by the FI in support of
the intermediary bank turns out to be a very powerful instrument given that it allows
to eliminate the credit crunch problem especially in periods of crisis.





















6.1 Which role for the EIBG?
It is time to evaluate whether the analytical results obtained above apply to the concrete
case study that we have in mind. Can the EIBG remove the obstacles in the credit
market and unlock the access to the loan for SMEs?
As described in Section 2, the EIBG limits the amount of co-funding to 50% of
the project cost and sets an upper bound on guarantees. The aim is to avoid the
18occurrence of moral hazard between the EIBG and the intermediary bank. In our
theoretical model, this translates into ￿ 2 [￿;1]; with ￿ ￿ 1













￿ ￿ ￿; (30)
which is the minimum cost of raising fund necessary to fully eliminate the credit crunch
area when co-funding is at its maximum of 50%.




, the minimum cost of raising fund attainable







































. We can therefore state:
Proposition 3 The e⁄ectiveness of the EIBG ultimately depends on the spread be-
tween ￿ and ￿: In particular: (i) if (31) holds, the credit crunch problem is
eliminated only by relaxing the upper constraints on the amount of co-funding,




; (ii) if (32) holds instead, such con-
straints do not prevent the EIBG from overcoming the credit crunch.
The result of Proposition 3 indicates that we have to focus our attention on two
parametric intervals: (31) denotes a relatively medium spread between ￿ and ￿, whilst
(32) a higher one. Only when the spread is su¢ ciently high, the EIBG is able to
eliminate the credit crunch problem by respecting the constraints on co-funding and
guarantee support. We already know from Proposition 2 that the intervention of the
FI allows to eliminate the credit crunch problem especially in periods of crisis. Here
we can con￿rm that the more severe the crisis, the more e⁄ective the intervention by
the EIBG in support of intermediary banks ￿nancing SMEs￿productive projects.
7 Conclusion
The recent crisis of the global ￿nancial system has generated a wide debate on the
necessity of supranational ￿nancial institutions playing an active role in enhancing
credit availability. In this paper we have fundamentally demonstrated how nonpro￿t
top-credit-rated ￿nancial institutions providing additional credit and guarantees to in-
termediary banks can mitigate informational problems between lenders and borrowers.
This is crucial in periods of crisis, where trust between economic actors has to be re-
established. Focusing on the European context, we have argued that the European
19Investment Bank Group is a very good candidate for this task, as it can e⁄ectively sup-
port intermediary banks to ￿nance creditworthy projects proposed by SMEs. Indeed,
we have shown that the intervention of the EIBG turns out to be particularly helpful
when the credit market is hit the hardest by the ￿nancial crisis.
Recent reforms and new measures taken by the EIBG reinforce the validity of the
message conveyed in our contribution. After the dramatic deterioration of the situation
on the ￿nancial markets and the expansion of the economic crisis, the EIBG reinforced
its skills with ￿anti-crisis measures￿ . In particular, the EIBG deployed exceptional
resources in support of SMEs. In a Brie￿ng Note it was written that:
"[...] the EIB Group launched an out-and-out o⁄ensive in support of SMEs,
which have been indirectly a⁄ected by the ￿nancial crisis and, consequently, the
credit squeeze. In its role as a public bank, the EIB was asked by the European
Council to commit unprecedented sums, EUR 30bn, in the form of loans for SMEs
via commercial banks by 2011. The EIB is on its way to meeting these targets for
in 2008 it granted a total of EUR 8.1bn in credit lines for SMEs to 75 commercial
banks in 16 countries and aims to cover the whole European Union in 2009"
(Annual Press Conference 2009, Brie￿ng Note No.5, Brussels, 9 March 2009)
We are convinced that a prompt and lasting recovery has to pass through a wide-
spread feeling of trust, primarily raising the morale of those "small" and innovative
entrepreneurs that represent the backbone of the newly established economic and ￿-
nancial system. We have shown that the EIBG can mitigate the informational problem
connected to the squeeze of the credit availability. Nonetheless, the activity of this
institution should be included in a broader and integrated European framework.
8 Appendix
In this Appendix we consider the case of a monopolistic local bank, which sets the
gross rate r in order to maximize its expected share vi ￿ pir￿￿, provided that the ￿rm
participates and selects project i. The following ￿rm￿ s constraints have to be satis￿ed:
the participation constraint ui ￿ pi (a ￿ r) ￿ ci > 0 and the incentive compatibility
constraint ui > u￿i, with ￿i = L;H; they ensure that choosing project i gives to the
￿rm a nonlower share than the outside option and the choice of project ￿i, respectively.




ui > 0 when r 6 ri = a ￿
ci
pi
. Since cH > 0 and cL = 0 it is always true that ri > ^ r,
hence the bank faces a trade-o⁄: its share is increasing in r, but when r > ^ r the ￿rm
chooses the bad project, thus reducing total welfare. The bank is then forced to propose
a lower interest rate to have the ￿rm selecting project H.
We have now all the elements to solve the problem of the bank, i.e. to maximize
vi ￿ pir￿￿. When setting ^ r, the maximum interest rate that induces the ￿rm to select
20project H, the bank gets vH (^ r) = sH ￿
pL
￿pc, whilst the ￿rm obtains uH (^ r) =
pL
￿pc.
On the other hand, when setting rL > ^ r, the maximum interest rate that induces
the ￿rm to participate by choosing the bad project, the bank ends up with vL (rL) = sL
and the ￿rm with zero.
Alternatively, the bank has the possibility to monitor the proper implementation
of the good project at total cost m. In this case we know that the moral hazard issue
disappears: the bank￿ s problem is to choose r to maximize vH (m) ￿ pHr￿￿￿m, subject




the bank gets vH (rM) = sH ￿ m and the ￿rm zero.
The IB compares its expected share when setting either rL or ^ r or rM. First,
setting rL is not pro￿table as vL (rL) = sL is negative under Assumption 1. Second,
Assumption 2 is su¢ cient to rule out monitoring, as it implies that vH (rM) is lower







We can conclude that the LB proposes the contract f^ rg and that the ￿rm accepts
if a ￿ aN, otherwise no loan is proposed: the result of Lemma 1 still holds, with the
only di⁄erence that the ￿rm does not appropriate the entire welfare when the loan is
granted. Modifying the relative bargaining power between the parties produces only a
redistributive e⁄ect.
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